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ABSTRACT 
The recent bankruptcy of the eGrocer Webvan demonstrates that online retailers face enormous risks 
and hence need well thought out business strategies (Porter, 2001). This paper presents a longitudinal 
study of the business strategies of two eGrocers that use physical stores to house their Internet-based 
grocery operations (clicks-and-bricks) and two online only (pure-play) eGrocers. Our study results in 
a number of recommendations for successful eGrocer strategy configuration. Even though we focus on 
eGrocer’s strategies, we suggest that the lessons learned are of interest to other retailers planning to 
embark on eCommerce activities. 
Keywords: Internet, Brick-and-Clicks eGrocer, Pure-Play eGrocer, Strategy. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Internet-based dot-com revolution of the 1990s motivated many grocers to embark on new ways 
of retailing. However, being enamored by the Internet’s technological capabilities many grocers failed 
to consider how it could support grocery retailing. This led to the demise of pure-online supermarkets 
such as Webvan, Streamline, Homegrocer, Homeruns, and Shoplink (Ramus and Nielsen, 2005). 
These events demonstrate the need for carefully crafted online grocery strategies that exploit the 
Internet’s potential of increasing customer value-added services and company profits (Kervenoael et 
al., 2006; Porter, 2001). 
On the one hand, strategy formulation for pure-play stores is difficult because such companies employ 
business models not tried before. On the other hand, strategy formulation for clicks-and-bricks stores 
requires combining already existing retailing practice with new value-added Internet-enabled 
processes (Teo, 2002). Internet-based grocery retailing involves customer attitudes toward online 
shopping and buying practices, order fulfilling and delivery logistics, and development and 
maintenance of websites providing customers the ability to enter orders (Hong and Kim, 2004). The 
literature is replete with articles that in effect see eGrocery strategy formulation as a one-time 
occurrence taking place at the start of an eGrocery venture (Doherty and Ellis-Chadwick, 2006). We 
propose, however, that eCommerce strategy should be subjected to continuous change or stated 
differently strategy should be evolutionary in nature. 
Our research project is a multi-year longitudinal case study involving four retailers that engaged in 
alternative approaches to eGrocer strategy formulation. Two companies are traditional groceres with 
decades of industry experience that became clicks-and-bricks grocers. One company is US-based and 
located in a major metropolitan area in the Midwest. The other company is located throughout 
Belgium, a densely populated West European country where it serves customers living in large 
metropolitan areas as well as smaller cities in the provinces. The other two companies were 
established in late 1990 and early 2000 and are US-based pure-play eGrocers. 
As mentioned earlier our research project’s insight into eGrocer strategy formulation based on actual 
experiences of four eGrocers. First, we seek to achieve insight into how uptake of Internet-based 
eGrocer relates to management orientation and prior retailing experience. Second, we aim to find 
relationships between the uptake of Internet-based eGrocer and entrepreneurial orientation, 
competitive intensity, and IT maturity. 
2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This article focuses on Schnucks and Colruyt that sell groceries in stores and online, and WebVan, and 
FreshDirect that only sell groceries online. The study of Schnucks and Colruyt uses our interview data 
from top and middle level managers, and company and public documents. The study of WebVan and 
FreshDirect lacks interview data and, instead, uses data drawn from trade journal publications and 
journal articles. 
The interviews with Schnucks’ (Marketing Manager, 2000, 2002; IT Manager, 2002; Logistics 
Manager, 2003) and Colruyt’s (Marketing Manager, 2001; CEO Distribution, 2003: IT Manager, 
2006) top and middle level managers were conducted on-site, audio taped, and transcribed. The 
interviews were semi-structured, thus enabling interviewees to tell their story in their own way. To 
ensure factual accuracy and, hence, descriptive validity the transcribed interviews were returned to the 
interviewees for inspection and correction (Maxwell, 2002). 
While studying Schnucks’ and Colruyt’s interview transcripts, internal and public documents, and 
where available annual reports, we sought to understand how actors understood changes in the 
business environment arising from the introduction of the Internet. Lacking interview material from 
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WebVan’s and FreshDirect’s managerial personnel we drew from public documents our understanding 
of how actors conceptualized changes arising from the Internet (Brohan, 2004; Dignan, 2004; 
Himelstein and Khermouch, 2001; Gallagher, 2005; Weiss, 2001; Wind, J., Mittelstaedt, R., 2001). 
Hence, our understanding of the subjects’ perceptions and actions was based on and validated against 
a historical background of the broader business and competitive impacts arising from the arrival of the 
Internet. These interpretive steps are iterative and, hence, we went through a number of hermeneutical 
circles to gain a proper understanding (Klein and Meyers, 1999). 
Our analysis took place within the context of Porter’s (2001) conceptualization of business strategy in 
reaction to the Internet. This made possible uncovering how the actors’ lived experiences, company 
characteristics, and business environments played a role in Internet strategy formulation. Validity of 
our findings was further buttressed by studying multiple cases and interviewees, company and public 
documents, and data analysis by multiple authors (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
An important concern involves generalizability, namely, do the lessons learned apply to other 
comparable situations? Because of the study’s focus on grocery stores we suggest that our results are 
significant to other grocery retailers that contemplate adopting eGrocery. Moreover, selling groceries 
has much in common with retailing other products. Thus, we propose that the study’s results are of 
interest to eCommerce strategy formulation of other retailers. 
3 FOUR E-GROCERY CASES 
3.1 Schnucks: The Company 
Schnucks is a family-owned grocery chain located in St. Louis, a large Midwestern city. Because the 
company does not issue annual reports, financial, operational, and information concerning Schnucks 
are drawn from local newspapers and trade journals (Staff, 2006). 
The company was founded in 1939 as a 1,000-square-foot grocery store. Despite this modest start 
Schnucks today is among the fiftieth largest grocery chains in the United States with annual sales 
revenues and profit of $2.1 billion and $60 million. The company employs 16,000 individuals of 
whom 50 work in the IT department. Schnucks comprises 102 stores that sell groceries, ready-made 
pre-packaged food, personal care items, fresh baked goods, meats, fresh seafood and produce, dairy 
products and a wide assortment of quality Californian, French, Italian, and South American wines at 
each location (Staff, 2006). 
The company’s business strategy is to attract affluent customers and offer a wide choice of products 
and services, customer friendly service, and stores with an attractive ambiance. Many of the 
company’s stores are located in super centers that feature other nonfood retailers. This arrangement 
attracts customers because it makes for a rich shopping environment where one can shop for groceries 
as well as a wide range of other non-grocery products. 
The company makes extensive use of IT and other advanced technologies such as voice over Internet 
communication, a logistics system to locate, track and direct mobile workers with text and voice 
messages, a global positioning system, self-checkout stations, and electronic radio receivers placed on 
shopping carts to reduce loss and theft (Baran, 2005). The company’s marketing manager reported that 
the company’s web-based point-of-sales system gives management timely, accurate, and 
comprehensive information that is then used as input to a software package that is used for making 
concise operational decisions and improving customer service levels. In spite of its considerable 
degree of informatization the company’s IT department is rather small considering that approximately 
50 employees operate and maintain the IT infrastructure (Manager of IT Interview, 2003). 
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3.2 Colruyt 
The Colruyt Company opened its first food discount store in 1965 – a revolutionary concept in 
Belgium at that time.  In spite of its humble origins Colruyt is presently Belgium’s third largest 
grocery chain, comprising 190 stores with annual revenue and profit of $4.3 billion and $240 million 
(Colruyt Annual Report, 2005/2006). The company employs 12,000 individuals 450 of whom work in 
the company’s IT department (Colruyt Annual Report, 2005/2006). The Company provides its 
customers a wide range of high quality foods with well-known brands, each item priced below that 
charged by the closes competitor. Each day fifteen company employees visit competing stores and 
scour newspapers for competitor advertisements, write down prices which are then checked against a 
computerized database and when indicated Colruyt adjusts its price downward (Colruyt Annual 
Report, 2005/2006). The company also sells organic foods and quality wines, and non food items such 
as children’s toys, baby supplies, clothing and electrical household supplies, electrical equipment and 
electronics such as stereo and TV sets. 
In keeping with its “lowest price” business policy the company keeps its store interiors sober, avoids 
unnecessarily high lighting levels, and places store shelving to optimize worker efficiency. Customer 
checkout stations are configured to ensure efficient client service and high throughput. Namely, the 
client presents his/her cart to the checkout clerk who, after scanning the items, places them in a second 
cart which the customer then takes to a payment station. This procedure frees up the checkout clerk to 
serve the next customer in line. In short, unnecessary luxuries are judiciously avoided, employee 
efficiency and effectiveness and client service optimized (Colruyt Annual Report, 2005/2006). 
Colruyt’s management consistently organized operations around the possibilities inherent in IT. 
Automated business processes include ordering store supplies at the end of the day, restocking the 
company’s two warehouses, scheduling truck routes to resupply stores daily, and conducting online 
B2B electronic commerce with suppliers. Colruyt’s most essential IT system, which was developed 
inhouse, enables knowledge management, calendaring, and eMail. 
3.3 Webvan: The Company 
The entrepreneurs who conceived of Webvan assumed that many consumers disliked or lacked the 
time to shop for groceries traditional supermarkets. They therefore conjectured that such customers 
would find purchase groceries online attractive and would be willing to pay a fee for home delivery. 
These conjectures motivated Louis Borders of the Borders bookstore chain and his brother to found 
Webvan, a company that would sell groceries on the Internet only. These entrepreneurs successfully 
raised $1.2 billion in startup financing from, among others, Benchmark Capital and others Wharton 
School of Management (Knowledge@Wharton, 2001a). 
Webvan planned to install highly informatized distribution centers that could complete 8,000 orders 
daily in twenty-six of America’s largest cities. Development and installation of the distribution centers 
was outsourced at $35 million each to the Bechtel Company. Webvan opened its first facility in San 
Francisco (CA) in June of 1999 (Whidden, 1999). Two years later in July, 2001 Webvan’s executives 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ceased all operations (Himelstein and Khermouch, 2001). 
The literature lists several reasons for Webvan’s demise. First, top-level managers lacked first hand 
experience of the grocery retailing industry. Therefore, these managers did not know the percentage of 
customers willing to order groceries online for home delivery, how to price home delivery, and how to 
efficiently arrange the delivery logistics. Second, executives seemed not to appreciate the struggles the 
British clicks-and-bricks eGrocer Tesco went through to make Internet-based grocery selling a success 
(http://www.tesco.shoppingdeliveryco.uk). These issues as well as further mistakes led to Webvan’s 
bankruptcy (Weiss, 2001). 
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3.4 FreshDirect: The Company 
FreshDirect (http://www.freshdirect.com), a pure player operating in New York opened for business in 
2002 and offers customers online grocery shopping combined with home delivery. Because companies 
such as HomeRuns, ShopLink, Streamline, and Webvan experienced business failure, it is especially 
interesting to investigate what FreshDirect learned from its predecessors, how this affected the 
company’s business practices, and to assess the likelihood of business success (Gallagher, 2005). 
FreshDirect employs 650 individuals who fulfill 3,300 customer orders daily, each at an average cost 
of $100.00. FreshDirect profited from Webvan’s demise by inexpensively purchasing the latter’s 
automated order fulfillment system with a 22,000 customer capacity. The fulfillment system features a 
conveyor belt which moves through stations that contain steaks, bread, fruits, greens, coffees and teas, 
et cetera. FreshDirect uses the SAP manufacturing enterprise system which in collaboration with an 
Oracle database arranges the work schedules that direct fulfilling each order. Completed orders are 
then placed in cases which are loaded on delivery trucks for customer delivery (Dignan, 2004). 
Unlike Webvan’s executives, who lacked any meaningful experience selling groceries or the grocery 
retailing industry, FreshDirect’s founder, Mr. Fedele, had extensive experience planning, starting, and 
operating Fairway Uptown, a New York City gourmet supermarket. By locating in New York City the 
company serves customers living closely together which results in short distances between delivery 
stops, thus improving the logistic chain’s efficiency and reducing delivery costs. Then, after achieving 
success in New York City the company’s management indicated willingness to consider expanding to 
one or more densely populated cities such as, for example, Los Angeles and Chicago (Dignan, 2004). 
4 BUSINESS STRATEGY ANALYSIS 
Our research findings can be summarized in terms of managerial disposition and corporate response. 
The horizontal and vertical dimensions of Figure 1 characterize managerial disposition as Futuristic or 
Pragmatic and corporate response as Conservative, Progressive, or Radical, respectively. 
4.1 Schnucks Strategy 
Schnucks managers studied the potential of the Internet with the aim to offer customers new services. 
The marketing manager stated: 
“We [did not] want to overlook anything…positive for our customers [Thus] when Prodigy in the 
early 90s [asked] if we were in interested in being the [online] retailer for our area the [company] 
owners jumped at it. We did not expect much of it right away but [we assumed] the day might 
come when it [would] become a big deal. [Prodigy’s] system generated just 75 to 100 weekly 
orders, but customers absolutely loved it.” (Interview Marketing Manager, 2000, 2002) 
This quote shows the manager’s futuristic disposition towards online shopping coupled with the aim to 
do so in a conservative manner characterized by little risk to the company. Partnering with Prodigy 
was management’s conservative response to online grocery shopping that kept financial risk to the 
company at a minimum (Figure 1). Therefore, Schnucks’ strategy during the 1990 to 1995 period is 
defined as Conservative-Futuristic (Figure 1). In 1993, however Prodigy sought to renegotiate its 
contractual obligations, which in turn caused Schnucks to abandon its online shopping service. 
Schnucks’ management team, however, reevaluated its decision when grocers such as Jewel, Peapod, 
and Safeway, embraced Internet-based grocery shopping.  Stated the VP for Logistics and Marketing: 
“Going into the B2C market was strictly a defensive measure. At the time you had company’s 
popping up out of the weeds on the web. … [Our strategy was] keeping our investment reasonably 
small so we could keep competition from coming [into our market]… but not spending a pile of 
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money on a project that we knew was…going to be…marginally profitable” (Interview VP 
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Figure 1 Strategies for Internet-based Grocery Retailing 
The VP continued with:  
“[Our strategy was] keeping our investment reasonably small so we could keep competition from 
coming in but…not spending a pile of money on a project that we knew was…going to 
be…marginally profitable.” [Vice President of Logistics and IT, 2003] 
The two quotes show the manager’s defensive and thus practical disposition towards online shopping 
coupled with a conservative response to keeping the Internet-based grocery selling system 
development cost at a minimum. The Marketing Manager observed: 
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The company, in a further effort to minimize cost, housed its online grocery service in is stores which 
means that customer orders are prepared in already existing warehouse facilities with  order fulfillment 
being performed by store employees. Furthermore, grocery delivery is outsourced to an independent 
logistics company. 
Schnucks’ senior management considered online shopping a success because it did succeed in keeping 
the competition at bay and associated Schnucks’ name with progress while at the same time avoiding 
financial risk (Director of Logistics, 2003). That is to say, starting in 1996 Schnucks changed from a 
Conservative-Futuristic to a Conservative-Pragmatic Internet strategy (Figure 1). 
4.2 Colruyt Strategy 
Colruyt’s managers expected online sales to greatly impact the retailing industry but seriously 
questioned the manner in which eGrocer retailing was hyped during the 1990s. The company 
postponed spending financial resources until there was reason to believe that Internet-based grocery 
retailing would be profitable. Stated the General Manager of Distribution: 
“[We realized the] distribution industry was changing. Still we had our doubts [and felt] stores 
would not disappear – people want to see or taste the merchandise. We consulted a [consulting] 
company which [employed] eCommerce specialists – [they said online grocery] is technically 
possible but how much is the customer prepared to pay for this service – perhaps [an additional] 
10% - some will but how many – 2%, 5%, 10%, or 50% [of customers] - we did not know.” 
(Interview, General Manager of Distribution, 2003) 
In short, Colruyt’s management team was future oriented in the sense that at a future time online 
grocery retailing could have promise, but to what degree was an unknown during the 1990s.  In 
keeping with this assumption the company took a wait-and-see approach and, hence, its response was 
of a conservative nature. In short during the 1990s the company is best described as Conservative-
Futuristic (Figure 1). 
During the late 1990s the company tested the commercial viability of Internet-based retailing by 
placing its wine catalog online. Customers would, after first downloading a wine order form from, fax 
their order to the store and then visit the store to pickup the completed order. 
“[The] start of [online sales] was visionary – after that it was continuing what [we] started step-by-
step. [In the process] one becomes less afraid because there already is a basis [on which to 
proceed]. One has to add online features carefully; because ones started it is impossible to retreat 
without harming the company’s image.” (Interview, General Manager of Distribution, 2003) 
The strategy was very conservative, in that it built on prior experience with traditional wine catalog 
sales by enabling customers to downloaded order forms instead of picking these up at the store. Hence, 
during the late 1990s Colruyt’s strategy is best described as Conservative/Futuristic (Figure 1). 
Experience with the online wine catalog indicated considerable customer interest in online shopping 
and in 2001 Colruyt progressed to online ordering of groceries and classic wines. The customer would 
order online but visit a store for pickup of the completed orders (2000/2001 Annual Report).  If a 
sufficient number of customers showed interest in ordering groceries online the company envisioned 
expanding its website to include other services and products. Thus, during the early twenty-first 
century the company’s strategy is best described as Progressive/Futuristic (Figure 1). 
4.3 Webvan Strategy 
Webvan’s embarked on a strategy in the sense that no company done so before and, hence, the 
company aimed to reinvent grocery retailing by offering Internet-based grocery shopping. Webvan’s 
radical approach is further supported by Kaplan, President of Equity Analytics: 
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“They [i.e., Webvan] are melding the latest in Internet retailing with the latest in retail distribution. 
They are redefining the entire retail sales process over the Internet.” (Whidden, 1999) 
Management planned a presence in twenty-six major cities and contracted with the Bechtel 
Corporation to build fulfillment centers at a price of $38 million each (Knowledge@Whaton, 2001b). 
When it filed for bankruptcy Webvan operated in Chicago, Los Angeles, Orange County, Portland 
(OR), San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. 
Webvan’s business strategy focused on relieving people from having to visit stores to purchase 
groceries and bypass bricks-and-clicks stores.  To increase operational efficiency Webvan invested in 
motorized carousels and robotic product picking machines that were not standard but needed to be 
newly developed at great cost. This strategy relied on a mistaken assumption that sufficient numbers 
of customers disliked in-store shopping enough to switch to online buying. The aforementioned issues 
combined into a complex problem involving business processes, IS, and logistics which Webvan 
failed to master resulting in its ultimate demise. 
Webvan was among the earliest companies to create a pure play Internet store, that is, to sell groceries 
entirely online rather than in a bricks-and-clicks format. Because the company’s approach to retailing 
was totally new and differed drastically from industry practice at the time, Webvan’s strategy is 
Radical/Futuristic. Unfortunately, the time of its 2001 bankruptcy filing Webvan failed to progress to 
the Radical/Practical stage (Figure 1). 
4.4 FreshDirect Strategy 
FreshDirect’s business plan was developed during the 2000 to 2002 period and the company 
subsequently fine commenced operations, implemented IT systems, and established a customer base. 
FreshDirect and WebVan are similar to the extent that both companies enable customers to buy 
groceries online only. The two companies differ significantly with respect to products sold and type of 
customer. First, whereas WebVan focused primarily on Internet as a technology, FreshDirect assigned 
the Internet a supporting role. Second, whereas Webvan served a public living in low population 
density areas, FreshDirect focuses on individuals living in high population density areas, i.e., 
Manhatten, NY, with demanding culinary tastes. Webvan operated in multiple cities whereas 
FreshDirect operates in a single city. FreshDirect, uses the Internet to deliver customers a value-added 
buying experience and to avoids the expenses of owning and maintaining shelf space, and thus 
reducing transaction cost taking and fulfilling customer orders (Kirkpatrick, 2002). Hence, based on 
these observations during the 2000 to 2002 period FreshDirect’s strategy is best described as 
Radical/Futuristic (Figure 1). 
FreshDirect’s business strategy consists of selling high quality food items and fresh produce 
reasonably priced, using automated warehouse equipment where possible, directing operations with 
enterprise resource management software (SAP), and using the Internet to increase overall efficiency 
in a market characterized by high population density and thus short delivery routes (Brohan, 2004). 
During the 2003 to 2007 period FreshDirect further extended its customer offerings to include kosher 
foods, expanded its customer base, and became profitable (Schoenberger, 2006). FreshDirect became 
an ongoing company and, hence, the company’s strategy progressed from radical/visionary to 
radical/pragmatic (Figure 1). 
5 DISCUSSION 
This section relates success or failure of the four eGrocer strategies in terms of the developmental 




During the Pre-Internet/eGrocer period Schnucks obtained valuable knowledge concerning eGrocer by 
using Prodigy’s network to sell groceries online (Table 1). Next, Prodigy’s demise caused Schnucks to 
progress to the No-Website/No-eGrocer stage during which it tracked competitors’ response to the 
technical developments in the grocery retailing industry. In these efforts the company achieved great 
benefit from the commercial and technical strengths of its retailing and IT departments. An analysis of 
aforementioned information motivated Schnucks to implement a realistic eGrocer strategy and 
progressed directly to the Website/eGrocer stage (Table 1). The company developed and implemented 
a basic yet functional eGrocer website that provided customers eGrocer services. Schnucks minimized 
cost by fully integrating eGrocer operational costs with its bricks-and-clicks operation. 
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Table 1 eCommerce Strategy Developmental Stages 
It is important to point out that Schnucks embraced the eGrocery concept to fend off competitors from 
entering its market with eGrocer services, a strategy which ultimately proved successful. However, 
when customers came to depend on online grocery buying Schnucks was forced to maintain its online 
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service but refrained from developing the service to its fullest potential. Figure 1 shows Schnucks’ 
business strategy evolving from Conservative/Futuristic to a Conservative/Pragmatic. 
5.2 Colruyt 
In the Pre-Internet eGrocery period stage Colruyt gained valuable experience and knowledge 
concerning off-line catalog sales of non-food products and specialty wines (Table 1). Customers 
would visit a company bricks-and-clicks store use a computer terminal to place orders which 
customers would  either pickup the completed order at the store or have them home delivered. This 
operation provided Colruyt important information concerning customers’ proclivity towards eGrocer 
and about home delivery logistics. 
The company remained in the No Website/No eGrocery stage while all the time observing 
developments in the grocery industry especially with respect to Internet development. After becoming 
convinced that online grocery sales had promise Colruyt progressed to the Website/No-eGrocer (Table 
1) by creating a website from which customers would download forms for ordering wines. The 
knowledge gained during the Website/No-eGrocer stage became the foundation for developing a 
cogent eGrocery strategy and thus leading to the company being placed in the conservative/visionary 
cell (Figure 1).  
Colruyt then progressed to the Website/eGrocery stage by implementing a full-featured website that 
enabled customers to order wine and groceries for store pickup or home delivery (Table 1), thus 
placing the company in the progressive/visionary cell (Figure 1). The company’s eGrocer service was 
fully integrated with existing food distribution operations as orders were processed at bricks-and-
clicks outlets for either customer pickup or home delivery. When the online grocery service was 
adopted by a sufficiently large number of customers and proved profitable, Colruyt extended the 
concept into eCommerce by creating online stores offering bio-foods and fresh meats, and non-food 
items such as small electrical household appliances and baby clothes. Figure 1 shows Colruyt’s 
business strategy evolving from Conservative/Futuristic through Progressive/Futuristic to 
Progressive/Pragmatic. 
We point out that Colruyt embraced eGrocery because top level managers grasped the commercial 
viability of and customers’ interest in the concept. In its efforts the company relied heavily on the 
strengths of its commercial and IT departments.   
5.3 WebVan 
Unlike Schnucks and Colruyt, which gathered knowledge by traversing pre-Internet stages, Webvan’s 
launched its eGrocery operation by entering Website/eGrocery stage (Table 1), thus characterizing the 
company’s business strategy as Radical/Futuristic (Figure 1). However, WebVan’s executives lacked 
any experience in the grocery retailing industry and focused entirely on the Internet’s technological 
aspects. The combination of the two factors combined with faulty planning and unrealistic customer 
demand expectations led to WebVan’s demise while stuck in the radical/visionary cell (Figure1). 
5.4 FreshDirect 
FreshDirect progressed through only two stages, namely, No-Website/No-eGrocery and 
Website/eGrocery (Table 1). The chief executive had in-depth knowledge of grocery retailing arising 
from previously having been store manager. He augmented this knowledge by studying the causes of 
WebVan’s demise and profited from it by purchasing its mechanical order-picking hardware.  
Therefore, during the No-Website/No-eGrocer stage FreshDirect’s executive constructed the 
company’s eGrocery strategy, which was implemented in the Website/eGrocer stage (Table 1). After 
overcoming startup difficulties the company became an ongoing profitable concern and FreshDirect’s 
business strategy evolved from Radical/Futuristic to Radical/Pragmatic (Figure 1). 
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5.5 Lessons Learned 
First, WebVan’s experience demonstrates that relying on technological hubris by managers lacking in 
industry experience is highly risk prone and ultimately led to the company’s bankruptcy. 
Second, FreshDirect’s did learn from WebVan’s mistakes because the company emphasizes creating 
customer value-added, operating in a high density market, controlling cost. Today FreshDirect is a 
successful and profit online grocer. 
Third, even though Schnucks offers its customers value-added services, the company’s initial 
enthusiasm receded and the company’s primary goal became defending its market against potential 
threats by a major competitor. After achieving this goal, Schnucks needed to continue a business 
activity of little interest to the company because its customers expected eGrocer to continue. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Drawing on our research of the four cases, but especially Colruyt, Schnucks, and FreshDirect we 
suggest that a successful eCommerce strategy requires – 1) Deciding reasons for embracing eGrocery, 
namely, either defensive or offensive purposes, 2) Gathering industry specific knowledge and turning 
it into a basis for constructing realistic eCommerce strategies, 3) Recognizing knowledge as the basis 
for innovative ideas to be transformed into realistic eCommerce strategies, which in turn can be 
executed in the context of the larger organizational whole, 4) Testing the practicality of new ideas by 
building and testing small and inexpensive pilot programs that, when proved successful, are the basis 
for full scale implementation, 5) Exchanging, questioning, and testing ideas by individuals who are 
drawn from the company’s business and IT communities, 5) Developing IT-based eGrocery systems to 
be enlarged when needed to accommodate business growth arising from increased customer demand 
for expanded services, and 7) Developing Internet-based systems that not only enable customers to 
order electronically but which also enable two-way communication between the company and clients. 
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